Pierluigi Paganini
April 15, 2024
Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 are investigating the activity related to CVE-2024-3400 PAN-OS flaw and discovered that threat actors have been exploiting it since March 26, 2024.
CVE-2024-3400 (CVSS score of 10.0) is a critical command injection vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit the flaw to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on affected firewalls. This flaw impacts PAN-OS 10.2, PAN-OS 11.0, and PAN-OS 11.1 firewalls configured with GlobalProtect gateway or GlobalProtect portal (or both) and device telemetry enabled.
The researchers are tracking this cluster of activity, conducted by an unknown threat actor, under the name Operation MidnightEclipse.
“Palo Alto Networks is aware of malicious exploitation of this issue. We are tracking the initial exploitation of this vulnerability under the name Operation MidnightEclipse, as we assess with high confidence that known exploitation we’ve analyzed thus far is limited to a single threat actor.” . “We also assess that additional threat actors may attempt exploitation in the future.”
Upon exploiting the flaw, the threat actor was observed creating a cronjob that would run every minute to access commands hosted on an external server that would execute via bash.
The researchers were unable to access the commands executed by the attackers, however, they believe threat actors attempted to deploy a second Python-based backdoor on the vulnerable devices.
Researchers at cybersecurity firm Volexity referred this second Python backdor as UPSTYLE.
The UPSTYLE backdoor was hosted at hxxp://144.172.79[.]92/update.py, but Unit42 observed a similar backdoor hosted at nhdata.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws[.]com. According to the HTTP headers, the threat actor last modified it on April 7, 2024.
The first Python payload creates and executes another Python script (“system.pth”), which then decrypts and launches the embedded backdoor component, that executes the attackers’s command in a file named “sslvpn_ngx_error.log.”
After execution, the script records the command output in the file:
A noteworthy aspect of the attack sequence is that both the files used for command extraction and result logging are authentic files linked with the firewall:
“The script will then create another thread that runs a function called restore. The restore function takes the original content of the bootstrap.min.css file, as well as the original access and modified times, sleeps for 15 seconds and writes the original contents back to the file and sets the access and modified times to their originals.” continues the report. “The point of this function is to avoid leaving the output of the commands available for analysis. Also, this suggests that the threat actor has automation built into the client side of this backdoor, as they only have 15 seconds to grab the results before the backdoor overwrites the file.“
The threat actor, tracked by Volexity as UTA0218, remotely exploited the firewall device to establish a reverse shell and install additional tools. Their primary objective was to extract configuration data from the devices and then use it as a foothold to expand laterally within the targeted organizations.
“During its investigation, Volexity observed that UTA0218 attempted to install a custom Python backdoor, which Volexity calls UPSTYLE, on the firewall. The UPSTYLE backdoor allows the attacker to execute additional commands on the device via specially crafted network requests. Details on this backdoor are included further on in this report.” reads the published by Volexity. “As Volexity broadened its investigation, it discovered successful exploitation at multiple other customers and organizations dating back to March 26, 2024. Those attempts appear to be the threat actor testing the vulnerability by placing zero-byte files on firewall devices to validate exploitability.”
“After successfully exploiting devices, UTA0218 downloaded additional tooling from remote servers they controlled in order to facilitate access to victims’ internal networks. They quickly moved laterally through victims’ networks, extracting sensitive credentials and other files that would enable access during and potentially after the intrusion.” concludes Volexity. “The tradecraft and speed employed by the attacker suggests a highly capable threat actor with a clear playbook of what to access to further their objectives.”
(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Palo Alto Pan-OS)
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